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November 2021

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# Sri Lanka's macroeconomic policy Cohesion or confusion?

Published 2 months ago on 2021/08/31

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Efforts to attract FDI should be coupled with building effective policy strategies that instill and maintain credibility. Indeed, this is all the more important as Sri Lanka appears to be firmly against an IMF bailout... An IMF programme is mostly useful in firming up sovereign credit ratings and reviving sentiments of investors. But investor sentiments can also improve if governments put forward and implement credible policy strategies.

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Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka**By Dushni Weerakoon**

The hike in policy interest rates by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) in August is a shift from stimulus to exit strategies in the pandemic era. Such recalibrations globally focused on how to tackle the historically large debt-to-GDP ratios that the COVID pandemic leaves in its wake. At end 2020, advanced economies (AEs) on average had debt to the tune of 120% of their GDP with emerging markets economies (EMEs) t



distance at 65% of GDP. As the spotlight moves, the full impacts of the macroeconomic measures, hitherto obscured by the urgency to deal with the health crisis, are now under greater scrutiny.

### **Sri Lanka's debt metrics make an orderly exit more difficult**

Many countries, especially AEs, exercised their 'monetary sovereignty' to create a their own money to support stimulus efforts. They have done so through coordinated monetary/fiscal policies – i.e. using monetary policy to keep borrowing costs low and fiscal authorities provide back-stop assurance. Some are better positioned to manage inherent risks and conflicts of interest that are involved in this exercise. AEs have an advantage as issuers of reserve currencies with global demand and historically low interest rates; EMEs with limited exposure to foreign currency-denominated debt and hold comfortable stockpiles of reserves are less exposed to disruptive tail events.

Such countries can bring down their debt ratios if they are able to maintain nominal growth persistently above the average interest rates that they pay on their debt – growth-corrected interest rate ( $r-g$ ) whereby countries can run modest primary deficits and still have a stable or falling debt-to-GDP ratio.

Sri Lanka is not similarly positioned. Its debt metrics point to high vulnerabilities: a debt-to-GDP ratio of 101% of GDP, large exposure to foreign currency-denominated debt, and a hefty foreign debt repayment schedule. Under these conditions, the threat from a loss of monetary sovereignty was always self-evident. A depreciating currency, notwithstanding distortionary controls on imports and capital flows, worsens the debt vulnerability.

Domestic and foreign debts are hardly similar. Given Sri Lanka's debt metrics and fundamental economic imbalances that have generated them, simple accounting solutions do not always offer very plausible solutions. If the exchange rate depreciates, it adds to the value of outstanding debt, relative to the size of the economy, even if interest rates remain modest. Further, shocks like COVID-19 raise risk premia, and marginal borrowing costs rise suddenly and sharply, cutting countries abruptly out of financial markets.

### **Crucial to instill and retain macroeconomic policy credibility**

Short of distortionary measures such as inflating debt away or maintaining an overvalued currency, a primary surplus is needed to stop the public debt-to-GDP ratio from rising, and an even larger surplus is needed to reduce it. Improving the primary budget balance through tax increases or public spending cuts that are unpopular and have upfront costs. Given the government's unwillingness to go down this path, households and firms will be re-

instead to bear the cost through higher interest rates affect their consumption and investments.

Higher interest rates in this instance will also not 'pull capital to firm up the exchange rate given the risk premium in the currency front as depreciating pressure deepens. With a hand to cover barely two months of imports, the forex market continues to face volatility and instability until a steady stream of capital inflows, beyond short-term swaps, emerges. In the meantime, a depreciating domestic currency will increase the debt burden as calculated in that currency. If debt servicing interest rate costs are pushed persistently above the economic growth rate, Sri Lanka's debt burden will grow steadily in the absence of new borrowing – a context sometimes called a 'debt spiral'.

Without a clearly spelt-out debt sustainability path, Sri Lanka seems to be placing its reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI) to ease external pressures and revive economic growth – a successful outcome – i.e. productivity gains to drive long-term growth – the typical path. The more desirable is efficiency-seeking FDI, but this is also harder to attract. At present, a policy environment of import curbs and capital controls is more likely to see efficiency-seeking infrastructure-led FDI. The latter runs the risk of switching resources to non-productive sectors – reducing the availability of external financing over the longer term – and the prospect of a short-lived growth burst as before in the post-war years. Crucially, reliance on FDI leaves Sri Lanka at the mercy of developments beyond its control.

Rather, efforts to attract FDI should be coupled with building effective policy strategies to instill and maintain credibility. Indeed, this is all the more important as Sri Lanka has been firmly against an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout. IMF loan amounts are no longer as much of a constraint on debt relief with much of EME foreign debt held by institutional investors and China. An IMF programme is mostly useful in firming up credit ratings and reviving the sentiments of investors. But investor sentiments can only improve if governments put forward and implement credible policy strategies. By CBSL's policy rate adjustment to anchor expectations, for instance, will not stick if the financing of fiscal spending is to continue under yield control measures. Instead, renewed convictions on the credibility of the policy mix will drive economic fundamentals. As the country readies to transition out of pandemic-related emergency support, some notion of debt sustainability to anchor confidence should be the priority in Budget 2022 preparations.

\* This blog is based on the comprehensive chapter on "Economic Performance and Managing the Crisis and Promoting Recovery" in IPS' forthcoming annual flagship report.

## 'Sri Lanka: The State of Economy 2021'

Link to blog: <https://www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2021/08/30/sri-lankas-macroeconomic-policy-setting-cohesion-or-confusion/>

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