The challenges of reconstruction and rehabilitation following the December 2004 tsunami were new to Sri Lanka, and perhaps more complex than providing immediate relief. Information on the processes involved in delivering aid to the tsunami affected and the perceptions of individuals on the aid received and the aid delivery mechanisms remain limited. The Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) carried out a survey in July 2006 of 600 households in 14 Grama Niladhari Divisions (GNDs) in 6 affected districts across the Southern and Eastern Provinces in an attempt to obtain views on a broad range of issues including housing, livelihoods recovery, aid distribution, community cohesiveness, and disaster management. The key findings are highlighted as follows:

(1) Housing

The progress in housing is fairly slow, with close to half of tsunami-affected households still residing in temporary housing. Progress in housing is best for those outside the 2005 buffer zone in the Southern Province. Less than 6 per cent of surveyed households in this region were in temporary housing. The progress in housing is worst for those in the Eastern Province – for households both within and out side the zone. The progress is especially poor for households affected by the conflict.

The “no-build” buffer zone was a key reason for the slow progress in housing, especially for households within the 2005 “no-build” zone. Policy changes, lack of land, delays in donor assistance have been main reasons for delays in the donor-driven housing programme. Change in buffer zone rules and delays in accessing housing material have affected the progress in the owner-driven programme.

Most rebuilt houses, despite being smaller than pre-tsunami houses, are built with better materials. This is especially the case when houses are funded by own funds, funds from government or NGOs. 

In addition to slow progress in the donor-driven housing programme, most relocated households are worse off now in terms of quality of housing and access to services and employment. Many relocated households do not have their own sources of water and are worse off in terms of access to roads, pre-schools and health clinics compared to their pre-tsunami levels of access. About 80 per cent of the relocated claim that access to employment opportunities has worsened.

The survey results signal problems of coordination across various donors, especially those who have provided houses without adhering to government plans. At the macro level, the difference between the numbers of households eligible for housing and the number of houses already provided is taken as the housing requirement. However, if people have received houses outside their eligibility, or if people who received houses were not those eligible for houses, the above assessment will be incorrect.

(2) Livelihoods Recovery

All surveyed GNDs received livelihood support in terms of equipment and boats, livelihoods training and credit. The survey results show that 71 per cent have regained their old source of livelihood. About 8 per cent of heads of households have changed their livelihood, while 21 per cent are unemployed.

Income recovery patterns vary across regions, occupation groups and industry groups. Compared to the Southern Province, livelihood recovery is worse in the Eastern Province. The majority of workers in the informal sector have not recovered incomes.

Major constraints faced by households in recovering their incomes include loss of equipment, loss of work places, lack of working capital and personal injuries. Only 4 per cent indicate ethnic conflict as the main obstacle for income recovery.

Availability of more employment opportunities due to reconstruction has helped income recovery more than livelihood assistance. The provision of training, equipment, credit grants and transfers has mattered significantly in income recovery only to a very small share of the households (less than 1 per cent), possibly due to problems with access to markets.

The most common strategy for coping with income loss is reducing non-essential consumption followed by borrowing or dis-saving. However, of some concern is that a large percent of households have reduced food consumption as a coping strategy. A smaller percentage of households have also resorted to selling assets and sending more members of the household to work.

Although macro level information suggests that there have been numerous micro-credit programmes, these have not successfully penetrated the communities in need. In particular, only 15 per cent of households have applied for loans and only 10 per cent has received loans. However, amongst lenders, rural banks Samurdhi and other development banks were more accessible to households. Close to 80 per cent of those who applied for loans through these banks have received loans, given at lower interest rates and requiring less guarantees.

(3) Health and Education

There is some evidence of mental and physical health problems related to the tsunami. A third of the households have been offered or given counseling for distress.

Thirty per cent of households claimed to have children who are yet to restart schooling after the tsunami. This problem was only slightly more pronounced in the Eastern Province. Child labour is one reason for reduced school attendance. Income recovery seems to have a bearing on restarting schooling.

(4) Aid distribution and Disaster Preparedness

On the positive side, the results show only low levels of corruption at the household level. Very few households claimed to have had paid bribes to government or NGO officials to receive aid.

Information provided by key informant shows conflicts with regard to allocation of new houses, distribution of funds, and allocation of livelihood related assets. On the positive side, however, most GNs were of the view that almost all conflicts were amicably resolved through discussions with relevant parties.

Local level capacity and increased workload has affected aid distribution. The multitude of institutions at the center has led to duplication of work that resulted in increasing the administrative workload of already under resourced local level players, reducing the efficiency of aid distribution.

Although there have been numerous disaster preparedness training programmes in the affected areas, only a few households have actually benefited from these.

(The report was prepared by a team of researchers from the IPS including Nisha Arunatilake, Paul Steele Dushni Weerakoon, Kanchana Wickramasinghe and Priyanka Jayawardena. Financial support from the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo and assistance of MG Consultants, Colombo for information collection are acknowledged).